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Abstract
There has been a long tradition of presumed perfect mobility in urban economics. Workers switch their
locations in direct response to differences in local economic performance. Recent empirical observations
prove otherwise. The number of movers rapidly declines with distance moved while there is a positive
correlation between distance moved and skill level. I build a general equilibrium model of a system of cities
to explain the city-size distribution as a result of reduced mobility. Workers with a heterogeneous skill level
have a corresponding distance-tolerance level and self-sort into select cities. The resulting size distribution
reflects the trade-off between the distance moved and earning opportunities enhanced by agglomeration.
I extrapolate consumers’ tolerance towards distance and skill level from US Census data on city size and
intercity migration.
Keywords: labor mobility, internal migration, city-size distribution
JEL classification: J61, R12
1 Introduction
1.1 Consumers Are Not Footloose
Labor mobility exhibits recognizable geographical patterns. There is a log linear relationship between inter-
city migration and distance moved. An exceeding share of migration occurs within a close proximity and
there are only a few who move coast to coast. The US does not impose any statutory restrictions on relocation
of households, and yet, consumers behave as if there were some in place. Take St. Louis for example. Figure 1
represents the inflow into the city from other metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). The vast majority of people
in the city are from Missouri and Illinois when in fact consumers are free to move anywhere in the country.
The inflow drops at an exponential rate with distance. When the distance increases by 1%, the inflow from
that area drops by about 1%. It is known that the city-size distribution has a fat tail (cf. figure 2, Gabaix and
Ioannides [GI04], and Duranton [Dur07]). The intercity migration itself follows the same rank-size pattern as
shown in figure 1(b).
The city-size distribution is a result of household relocation. Any city size is the sum of the inflows into,
less the outflows out of, the city over time. It does not take a big leap to imagine that the city-size distribution
hinges on the degree of ease of movement. However, mobility has been overlooked in the literature, and
probably for good reasons (to be discussed below). The models of the city-size distribution traditionally
assume perfect mobility. Workers move to another city in direct response to local economic conditions
regardless of how far the distance moved is. The resulting equilibrium size distribution is independent from
where workers were in the period before. While the path dependence takes place on the side of productivity
at the city level, at the individual level, workers behave as if they do not remember or care which cities they
lived in preceding periods.
This paper is tasked with explaining why there is a correlation between inflow frequency and distance
moved in order to describe the city-size distribution as a result of intercity migration. I identify four causes,
among many, as critical factors behind the geographically bounded labor mobility.
∗Department of Economics, Concordia University, and CIREQ. Address: 1455 boul. de Maisonneuve O, Montréal (Québec) H3G 1M8.
E-mail: axel.watanabe@concordia.ca. I am grateful for valuable inputs from Xintong Han and Prosper Dovonon. The usual disclaimer
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Figure 1. Data source: US Census Bureau, 2009-2013 American Community Survey.
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Figure 2. US city-size distribution (population in log scale). Data source: US Census
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Figure 3. Reason for relocation by educational at-
tainment. Data source: Geographical mobility be-
tween 2014 and 2015, US Census.
The first conjecture is, all else equal, that the geographi-
cal extent of job search expands with the level of skill. Ph.D.
students on the job market fly everywhere, whereas it is un-
likely to see a high school student looking through fast food
restaurant chain’s vacancy notices all over the country. In
fact, employment-related reasons list among the primary fac-
tors of relocation. As figure 3 shows, employment-related
reasons become more predominant as the level of educational
attainment steps up.
Davis and Dingel [DD12] show that skilled labor tend to
move more frequently as a result of spatial sorting triggered
by idea exchange. In their model, Skilled labor has different
equilibrium utility levels depending on their skill level. They move to the city where they can make full use of
their skill. Consequently, they tend to move farther and more frequently compared to unskilled labor. They
suspect that their findings are set off by difference in the search behavior of workers of varying skill levels.
Rauch [Rau13] shares the same supposition. See Molloy et al. [MSW11] for other reasons behind relocation.
Regarding heterogeneous skills and spatial sorting, Behrens et al. [BDRN14] show that workers sort into
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a city and select their occupation according to their skill level. Along with skill levels, location-variant
serendipity determines the productivity and in turn the degree of agglomeration in each city. Eeckhout et al.
[EPS14] find evidence in support of extreme skill complementarity where the co-presence of workers from
top- and bottom-tier skill levels does not undermine but rather enhances their productivity. In either model,
relocation is costless or does not depend on the distance moved.
Mobility is a topic of interest in labor economics too, but not in the same sense as I discuss in the
current paper. Market imperfections lead to reduced mobility in terms of type-matched industry, but not
geographical mismatch (cf. Manning [Man10] and Hirsch et al. [HJO16]).
Along with the heterogeneous skill levels, uncertainty aversion may deter long-distance relocation. A
resident in Duluth, MN is likely to know more about the local economy of Minneapolis than that of Houston
for example. If he receives identical job offers from both locations, a move to Minneapolis is easier as he
does not have to learn about the city as much as he would about Houston. I expect that consumers become
exponentially less knowledgeable about the local economy of a city as it gets farther from his birthplace.
Thirdly, I assume that all else equal, a worker prefers to work near her birthplace for social reasons.
Whereas a worker may be mobile per se, it is prohibitively costly to move the entire network of people she
meets in her daily personal or social life. In addition, she may not know about the urban life in a distant city
as much as her home town’s. While job-related reasons are an important determinant in location choice as
discussed above, she does not live for her job alone. She might also enjoy the social life, which is intrinsically
chained to the location it takes place and she cannot take it with her to another city. Thus, presented with
two identical job opportunities, one in her birth city and the other from elsewhere, she prefers to take the
former.
Together with the cost of being far from their social network, workers may incur a lingering region-
specific cost due to cultural differences within the same country. If a Québécois educated mostly in French
moves to Vancouver for a job in an Anglophone firm, his productivity, and by extension, his lifetime earnings
may be lower than what he could have made in a comparable but Francophone firm in Montréal. A liberal-
minded Minnesota expat in the South may find the life there tormenting, compared to a Texan of a similar
educational background in the South. Even if he could go back to Minnesota, the experience in the South
may turn out to be a traumatic life event that stays with him for the rest of his life, and thus very costly to
him. These regional differences in societal norms act as a deterrent against free mobility. Indeed, Falck et al.
[FHLS12] document Germans’ reluctance to move outside of their area of shared regional dialect. Woodard
[Woo11] suggests similar cultural divides in the US, which reduces mobility.
1.2 Mobility in Urban Economics
Nevertheless, perfect mobility is a sensible assumption to make when analyzing the city-size distribution for
two reasons. For the most part, researchers regard a city as a placeholder to host households. They leave off
geographical features when conducting their analysis and focus on a size and other economic variables that
are not tied to the location of the city. The equilibrium is unique only up to the size distribution but not to
the location of cities.
On balance, urban economists have been good at deriving the true-to-life size distribution but not as
good at identifying where cities are. And rightly so because correspondence between the size and the
location is not the salient features in the existing models. Workers can switch their locations at no cost
and thus do not sense the distance when they relocate. It matters little which city hosts which point in
the predicted size distribution. One can move all New Yorkers to St. Louis, and drive all St. Louisans out
into Minneapolis (or any permutation of size and location thereof) without making any difference in the
equilibrium outcome. This is justifiable because the city-size distribution arises as a result of depleted spatial
arbitrage opportunities. Any difference by location, be it the utility level or real wage, will be eliminated
in the end as consumers move (freely) to exhaust any arbitrage opportunities left. This greatly reduces the
number of the equilibria. Any worker of the same attributes achieves the same utility level regardless of how
far they had to move to realize it.
In addition, one could argue that relocation cost (and by extension the distance moved) is negligible in
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the grand scheme of things. While a consumer incurs the cost of relocation only so often, the benefits of
relocation (e.g., higher wage, better quality of life etc.) keep accruing over time once relocation is complete.
Thus the difference in distance moved is easily dwarfed by the lifetime increase in economic welfare.
However, the assumption could be expedient. While it is true that the pecuniary cost of relocation is a
one-time expense, out-of-towners may pay other implicit prices over a long period of time, be it personal
or regional as I explored above. If workers have young children in their household, they cannot ask their
parents or other family members to look after them once they move out of the city. And day care services
take up a significant portion of their income. Workers may want to visit their family or close friends from
high school every holiday season, and those trips cost them more (both in terms of time and money) if they
live farther away from home.
1.3 Tolerance to Distance
While I cannot observe consumers’ aversion to distance moved per se, the resulting distribution figure 1(b)
clearly suggests its existence. In this light, the current paper breaks away from the convention and incor-
porates consumers’ tolerance to distance as described above. I listed four factors that contribute to con-
sumers’ reluctance to move, but I cannot tell them apart because they can be observed only indirectly via
the geographical distribution of inflow. Instead of representing them one by one, I model distance-bound
household’s behavior with a single, general variable that measures the degree of tolerance towards distance
moved. Each consumer will draw her tolerance level from a given distribution and makes a location choice
based on it. Distance tolerance is interpreted broadly to represent the aforementioned skill level, affinity to
the birthplace and region-specific characters rather than a mere distance. For instance, a consumer raised in
a liberal household in California may find Texas very “far” not only geographically but also psychologically,
resulting in a low tolerance towards distance.
In the context of Starrett’s spatial impossibility theorem (cf. Starrett [Sta78], and Boyd and Conley [BC97]),
I am violating two assumptions in this paper; one majorly and the other only trivially. First, free mobility is
the very assumption that I would like to forgo. Consumers do assess relocation cost and it makes a sizable
difference in their welfare. The overwhelming majority of models of the city-size distribution keep to the
assumption of free mobility instead. Second, I violate the assumption of homogeneous space to break the
symmetry in the size distribution. Each industry receives a productivity boost only in a city, but not in a
rural area. However, I keep the violation to a bare minimum: I do not introduce city-variant productivity
differences. All the industries share the same productivity regardless of which city they are housed in. I will
discuss more on productivity in (6). Regarding the remaining assumptions, unlike New Economic Geography
models (cf. Fujita et al. [FKV99]), I maintain the assumption of perfect and complete markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the upcoming section I will lay out the model and uncover
the relationship among distance, inflow and city size. I will validate my theoretical predictions in section 3
using US Census data, and section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Landscape
The economy is assumed to be closed. Some cities near the border may receive an economic boost for its
proximity to the country’s trading partners, or on the contrary, lag behind because they are far from the
center of domestic economic activities. In order to stay focused on reduced mobility, I take the country to be
a sphere X of size one. Since there is no end point on a sphere, if there is any asymmetry in equilibrium, I
know definitively that it is not caused by the terrestrial restrictions such as the proximity to the border or the
center of the country, but rather by imperfect mobility.
Consider a production economy of a system of cities. There are I cities indexed by i, and N (∈ R+)
consumers in the economy. The model rolls out in two stages. Initially, consumers are uniformly distributed
across the country. Each consumer is endowed with a pair (t, 2) ∈ {1, · · · , T} × Y (⊆ N×R). The first entry
is type t, which represents her skill and identifies her best suited industry to work in. There are nt of type-t
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consumers. Along with the type, she also draws her distance-tolerance factor 2 from the distribution with
probability density function (pdf) ft(2) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) Ft(2). A high 2 implies
that relocation is not costly and that she does not mind moving far. Note that
∫
Y
ft(2)d2= nt for all t, totaling
up to
∑
t
∫
Y
ft(2)d2= N nationwide.
The type distribution ft(2) may possibly depend not only on t but also on birthplace x ∈ X . However,
since consumers cannot chose a place to be born at, it is safer and more reasonable to assume that ft(2) takes
the same form regardless of the location.
In the first stage, consumer’s birthplace and type are revealed as above. However, for the reasons to be
discussed later in (14), consumers only know their value of (t, 2) but do not know from what distribution
their 2 is drawn.
In the second stage, consumers of type t make simultaneous and uncoordinated decision on their location.
A type-t consumer can either stay at her initial location x or move to one of the cities. For simplicity, assume
that each city attracts and/or hosts at most one type, in which case, T ≤ I . Furthermore, I set T = I so that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of types and the set of cities.1 For each type, there
exists exactly one city conducive exclusively to that type. Empirically speaking, this assumption is not much
of a restriction to impose because of flexibility in T . If T falls short of I , I may split “prospective doctors”
into “prospective doctors who speak French” and “prospective doctors who do not” to increase T till it
matches I (the latter cannot move to Québec unless they are willing to change their vocation). From here on
I refer to type t by its corresponding city i and use the term “city”, “type” and “industry” interchangeably
where applicable.2 I will review below three choices of location that a type-i consumer can make and their
consequences:
1. move to type-matched city i (as portrayed by Chloe, the city dweller),
2. stay put at x (by Ryan, the rural resident), or
3. move to type-discordant city j(, i) (by Diane, the disoriented).
2.2 Chloe the City Dweller
First, take a look at Chloe, a type-i consumer who becomes a resident of city i.
2.2.1 Consumption and Location Choice
Her preferences over a numéraire composite consumption good ci and housing hi are represented by
u(ci , hi; x , 2) = ci(x , 2) +η log hi(x , 2), (1)
where η measures the portion of her expenditure on housing. See appendix A.1 for other preference specifi-
cations and interpretation on ci(x , 2). She is endowed with a unit of time, which she converts into ci(x , 2) to
earn wage 4i . Her budget constraint is
4i ≥ ci(x , 2) + pihi(x , 2) +ρ [li(x), 2] , (2)
where li(x) is the geodesic (the shortest path on the sphere) between x and city i, and ρ(·) measures the
lifelong opportunity cost of relocation.3 4 For any give 2 the opportunity cost of relocation ρ(·) is increasing
and concave in geodesic. Consumers’ nonlinear perception of distance gives grounds for this assumption. A
1I could set T < I , which would become superfluous: As I will establish later, any city i > T will not have any inflow of workers and fall
off the list of cities anyway.
2I will discuss this assumption further in section 4.
3 There are three ways to factor in aversion to relocation: 1) Put 2 directly into the utility function with
∂ u(·, ·, 2)
∂ 2 > 0. 2) Put 2 into the
budget constraint. 3) Combine the two above. I went for 2) because it is the most interpretive way to disentangle the role of tolerance from
the overall end result. Since the utility level does not equalize in equilibrium, it is hard to keep track of ρ(·) if I leave it nested in the utility
function. Nevertheless, with appropriate parameterization and some added complications, 1) and 3) will also lead to the same results to
follow.
4I take η to be less than 4i −ρ(·) for any i, x and 2 to exclude corner solutions.
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St. Louis native will find a move from St. Louis to Chicago more draining than a move from Fairbanks to
Anchorage (roughly the same distance apart). The additional cost increase wears out with the distance.
Coupled with this assumption, I also implement ∂ ρ[li(x), 2]/∂ 2< 0, i.e., the higher the distance tolerance
is, the lower the relocation cost will be. Note that 4i is constant across x and 2, and preferences over
(ci(x), hi(x)) are the same across 2 according to the current specifications: Her productivity will neither
increase or decrease regardless of how far she moved to reach i or how much she was willing to do so. In
addition, her preferences for the bundle are independent of 2 (though her Marshallian demand ci(x , 2) and
by extension, her indirect utility function will differ by tolerance level in equilibrium).
In addition to finding the optimal consumption bundle, a consumer also needs to make her location
choice. Denote location choice by a mapping 1i(x , 2) : X × Y → {0, 1, · · · , I}. If a consumer who drew (x , 2)
decides to become a Chloe, 1i(x , 2) = i. Similarly, for Diane, 1i(x , 2) = j(, i). I tack 0 to the set of cities
for Ryan: 1i(x , 2) = 0. In preparation for definition 2.1 of feasibility to follow, define an indicator function
1{i}[1i(x , 2)] that takes the value of 1 if 1i(x , 2) = i and 0 otherwise. For instance, Chloe takes the value of 1
whereas Ryan and Diane take 0.
2.2.2 Feasibility
Figure 4. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the ball
with radius r = 1
2
p
pi
.
I will make a quick note here on the shape of the
country and the geographical distribution of con-
sumers. When the surface area is normalized to
unity, the radius of the ball is 1
2
p
pi
(cf. figure 4).
Since each type is uniquely associated with their
type-concordant city, in what follows, I will iden-
tify x by the geodesic length between the type city
and consumer’s birthplace. (I will nevertheless call
back li(x) if the distinction between a generic loca-
tion and geodesic location is necessary for identifi-
cation purposes, where applicable). Land supply x
radian away from city i is sin x
2
(the perimeter of the
cut surface in figure 4). Accordingly, a measure of
type-i residents born x radian away from city i is
ni
sin x
2
. The number of type-i residents in city i is
then
si =
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
∫
Y
1{i}[1i(x , 2)] dFi(2)d x (3)
With all the necessary variables and functions in hand, I formally define the feasible allocation in this
economy as follows:
Definition 2.1 Feasible Allocation:
An allocation is a list of functions [ci(x , 2), hi(x , 2), 1i(x , 2)]
I
i=1
with ci : X ×Y → R+ and hi : X ×Y → R+, location
choice 1i : X × Y → {0, 1, · · · , I}, and output (zi)Ii=1 ∈ RI+. Given type-size distribution (ni)
I
i=1
and distance-tolerance
distribution [ fi(2)]
I
i=1
, an allocation is feasible if
sizi =
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
∫
Y
1{i}[1i(x , 2)] ci(x , 2)dFi(2)d x , (4)
H =
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
∫
Y
1{i}[1i(x , 2)] hi(x , 2)dFi(2)d x , and (5)
si ≤ ni
for any i, where si is defined by (3).
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5Strictly speaking, I need to define Ryan’s allocation in definition 2.1 as well. I did not do so because the topic of interest, the city-size
distribution, does not depend on the feasibility with respect to Ryan-like consumers. The only role Ryan plays in the determination of the
size distribution is his absence, which I already made accounted for through the indicator function in (4) and (5). The same goes for Diane.
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As explained earlier, ρ(·) entails both tangible and intangible costs. It represents the airfare to visit Chloe’s
family every Thanksgiving for example. However, it goes beyond these out-of-pocket expenses. Along with
(4) and (5), I could as well hypothesize the third market for “consolation for relocation”. In other words,
Chloe or Diane “purchases” a unit of solace for being an expat or condolences for her virtual loss of friends
and families at the price of ρ(·). This third market would make it easier to interpret and place the present
model in the grand scheme of general equilibrium. While it is true that I seek to build a general equilibrium
model, I will leave out this market, because, hometown-bound airplanes aside, these “goods” do not come
in material form, and it is not clear who actually supplies them nor does there seem to be any resource
constraint on them to warrant an explicit condition. Instead, I simply take ρ(·) as a function of (x , 2) drawn
from the exogenous distribution and fold it into the budget constraint as an unavoidable dead load inflicted
upon her when she leaves her birthplace behind.
2.2.3 Production
Turning to production, as mentioned earlier, workers supply one unit of (perfectly inelastic) labor6 to produce
the composite goods with a constant returns to scale technology. In particular, τ units of labor produces
zi = Ai(si)τ units of composite goods. As opposed to what is conventionally assumed, I assume that Ai(si)
does not vary with industry i or city size si (unless it is zero). In particular
A(si) =
(
1 if si = 0
a(> 1) if si > 0.
(6)
In the current model, I do not rely on productivity differences to break the otherwise uniform distribution
of workers. I shut off the channel through which productivity differences bring in variations in city sizes in
order to isolate the role that distance tolerance plays, or else I will not be able to tell how much of the size
differences is the result of imperfect mobility. However, I still do need to secure some incentive for residents
to clump together in one location (a city). Absent economies of localization, no one will move to a city (cf.
Glaeser et al. [GKS01]). Specification (6) is the minimally invasive way to do so without introducing added
complications from type-dependent productivity.
Firms are a price taker and earn zero profit in equilibrium. Thus, each worker earns
4i = a. (7)
Evidently, the model does not pick up on the urban wage premium (cf. Yankow [Yan06]), which I can easily
incorporate by having a dependent on si in (6). Besides, my focus is imperfect mobility, not urban wage
premium. Note also that disposable income, i.e., wage 4i exclusive of the cost of relocation ρ(·), still varies
city to city, as 2 is drawn from type-specific fi(2), which in turn changes the realized value of ρ [li(x), 2] by
type, and subsequently, the disposable wage 4i −ρ(·) by city.7
2.3 Ryan the Rural Resident
Let us turn to Ryan. He is a type-i consumer who stays put. He becomes a Robinson Crusoe-type rural
resident to lead a life under the backyard capitalism. His marginal product gets pushed back to A(si = 0) =
1(< a) according to (6), housing consumption becomes independent of the city size, and the cost of relocation
turns ρ(0, 2) = 0. I mark his maximum utility level by 3i , which, by construction, is independent of x . It
still does depend on the housing units available in a rural area and how costly ρ(·) is to Chloe (and thus
how cost-saving it is to stay in the countryside by comparison). In order to keep the model on point, assume
that the land in the rural area is abundant enough and the number of people who do not move out of the
birthplace will not affect the value of 3i .
6Labor supply is not presumed to depend on the distance moved. An out-of-town worker may work more to compensate for the lifetime
cost of relocation. She may as well work less to spare time in rebuilding her social network in her newly acquainted foreign soil. In the
absence of available evidence, I shall take a neutral stance on labor supply.
7See appendix A.1 for more on the effective wage.
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Furthermore, assume 3i is the same across the types so as to remove arbitrariness. Variations in city size
are already captured by fi(2) and I do not need two sources of variations. I will discuss this further when I
determine the type composition between Chloe and Ryan in (14).
2.4 Diane the Disoriented
As a third option, another type-i consumer, Diane, could move to a type-incompatible city j(, i). In this
case, she will not receive a type-specific productivity boost either, i.e., A(si = 0) = 1. Worse yet, her housing
consumption will be smaller than the rural value above due to the likely presence of type- j residents choking
up the rent, whom Diane splits the land supply H with. As I will show later in (13), Ryan’s utility level is
at most Chloe’s. Thus, Diane in city j makes the same income (i.e., 1) as Ryan while having a smaller house
than Ryan’s. She will then achieve an even lower utility level than his. As such, I will safely rule out this last
option in equilibrium.8
2.5 Trans-Tolerance Value
For any given i,
ci(x , 2) = 4i −ρ [li(x), 2]−η, and (8)
hi(x , 2) =
η
pi
(9)
maximize (1) subject to (2). Chloe’s indirect utility function is then
3i (pi , 4i(x); x , 2, si) = 4i −ρ [li(x), 2]−η+η (logη− log pi) . (10)
Housing supply is H in each city and the housing market clears when
sihi = H, (11)
from which I obtain the equilibrium rent pi =
ηsi
H
, i.e, the more crowded the city becomes, the more expensive
the rent per unit will be. Note that the expenditure on housing is always pihi = η regardless of the city size:
Chloe copes with an increasing city size by reducing her lot size without changing her expenditure share of
housing.9
Firm’s first order condition (7) and housing market clearance (11) further simplify her indirect utility
function (10) to
3i (a, x , 2, si) = a−ρ [li(x), 2]−η log si +η(log H − 1). (12)
Unsurprisingly, Chloe’s utility level drops with distance x , holding everything else constant. Notice the
trade-off among the economies of agglomeration a, diseconomies of agglomeration −η log si and distance
tolerance 2. Holding the value of 3i(·) constant, if the destination city becomes crowded or the productivity
boost a gets smaller, the only residents with high enough tolerance 2 would become a Chloe, or else they are
better off becoming a Ryan.
Now consider who becomes a Chloe and who becomes a Ryan. A type-i consumer will become a Chloe
if her utility level (12) is greater than Ryan’s 3i :
3i (a, x , 2, si) = a−ρ [li(x), 2]−η log si +η(log H − 1)≥ 3i . (13)
A resident at the margin meets (13) with equality. Since ρ(·, 2) is strictly monotone decreasing in 2, one can
solve (13) with equality for 2 to define a trans-tolerance function
2i(x) ··= ρ−1

li(x), a−η log si +η(log H − 1)− 3i

. (14)
8At the intraurban level, there is an evidence of residents, albeit reluctantly, going for this option. See Coulson et al. [CLW01].
9Note also that as long as si > 0, any additional increase in si will not benefit Chloe in contrast to models that feature agglomeration.
In particular, agglomeration only swaps 1 in (6) with a that appears in (12) but nothing more regardless of the city size. Thus, for Chloe,
the best-case scenario is to have an infinitesimally small population in city i to unlock urban productivity (but she has no control over the
population).
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A couple of observations on (14) are in order. First off, 2i(x) determines the fraction of people to become
a Chloe. Anyone who drew 2 ≥ 2i(x) does not show much affinity to her birthplace or her opportunity
cost of staying put is too high and moves out, whereas anyone with 2 ≤ 2i(x) has a lot to lose by relocation
and stays in. Thus, the higher the trans-tolerance is, the higher the ratio of Ryan’s will be. In this regard,
trans-tolerance can be thought of as the minimum tolerance level required to make consumers want to move
out of their birthplace, or analogously, the maximum tolerance level permissible to have consumers stay in,
making it the threshold value of tolerance where the phase switches.
Secondly, 2i(x) is increasing in x because ρ(·) is increasing in li(x). In the vicinity of city i, the number
of Ryan’s is very small because it does not take much to turn residents a Chloe. As a result, the borderline
tolerance is pretty low. However, as the distance to i increases, the cost of relocation bears down on the
consumers and they will not become a Chloe as easily as before unless their tolerance is high, making the
borderline tolerance high as well.
There are in fact two ways to go about the trans-tolerance value. One is to assume that 2i(x) = 2(x) for
all i. The other is to allow 2i(x) to take different values depending on the type. I will explain the difference
between them below.
(a) Type-independent trans-tolerance. (b) Type-dependent trans-tolerance.
Figure 5. Shaded areas mark a measure of Chloe’s. In either case, type i has more Chloe’s than type j.
First suppose that 2i(x) = 2(x) for all i at any x ∈ X . If 2i(x) will be the same across the types, then
2 should have been drawn from different distributions depending on the type as in figure 5(a) (or else the
city-size distribution will be uniform). In this case, if fi(2) first-order stochastically dominates f j(2), then
si > s j (cf. (16) below). Type i should be more distance-tolerant than type j so that at any given x , more of
type i must have drawn 2 ≥ 2(x) than type j. In this case, 2 can be interpreted as a skill level that indicates
the favorable degree of concentration of workers. Industry j features low-skill labor that does not benefit
from concentration of workers within the same industry. Consequently, their distance tolerance is drawn
from the distribution with a low mean. By contrast, industry i involves a type of workers who capitalize
on interactions among them at a large scale. Type-i workers have a lower barrier to relocation because their
opportunity cost of staying put and not tapping into their urban productivity A(si)(> 1) is substantially high.
Now suppose instead that 2i(x) can differ from 2 j(x) but 2 itself is drawn from the identical distribution
regardless of the type as in figure 5(b). In this case, if 2i(x) < 2 j(x), then si > s j . The variation in city size
comes directly from (14), rather than the distribution from which 2 is drawn. City i has a larger influx of
people because the net effect of agglomeration a − η log si is large and/or the fallback utility level 3i is low.
Once again, type i is likely to be a high-skill type whereas industry j does not call for much concentration of
workers.
Empirically speaking, I cannot tell which one is at work because I do not have direct observations of
fi(2) or ρ
−1(·). To cover all bases, I will consider both type-dependent and -independent trans-tolerance
for the empirical analysis in section 3. For the theoretical analysis to follow, I will pick type-independent
trans-tolerance (figure 5(a)) for the following reasons.
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I make two simplifications in order to implement the first way in a consistent manner. First one is what
I already made in section 2.3. The fallback value 3 is shared across the type so that, holding everything else
constant, trans-tolerance will not change by type because of the utility level Ryan achieves. Second, I take
si that appears in (14) to be an expected value of si for technical reasons. In the current model, after 2 is
drawn, consumers move on to the next stage, where everyone makes a simultaneous decision on his/her
location. Consumers only know their draw of 2 but presumably do not know what distribution it is drawn
from (neither do we in reality). Consequently, they cannot accurately compute the value of si before making
decision. For this reason, consider si in (14) to be an expected value of si , shared across the type. In this way,
I keep 2i(x) constant with respect to i. Nevertheless, the type-difference will be factored into the equilibrium
through a different channel, i.e., through a type-variant fi(2).
It is ideal to have the expected city size constant across the type. In this way I can ascribe all the variance
in size to imperfect mobility rather than to the existing city size. However, in reality, location choice is not
simultaneous and consumers make sequential decisions on location knowing the existing city size. I can
easily model this by letting the estimated value of si in the first stage match the realized value in the second
stage, which effectively turns the model into figure 5(b). That said, even if I opt instead for type-independent
2(x), the model is still consistent in that it concludes in two stages. Once consumers make their location
choice, they cannot take back their decision and readjust their location upon the realization of si , as there
are no subsequent periods to do so. Furthermore, since I forgo the utility equalization in equilibrium (cf.
definition 2.2), workers are not set to readjust their location anyway.10
While the ratio between Chloe and Ryan declines with distance, the measure of city residents flowing in
from location x ,
mi(x) ··= ni
sin x
2
∫ ∞
2(x)
fi(2)d2, (15)
is not necessarily monotone in x (I will come back to this shortly). Consequently, the city size is
si =
∫ pi
0
mi(x)d x =
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
∫ ∞
2(x)
fi(2)d2d x . (16)
Note that si ≤ ni , i.e., not all the type-i residents become a Chloe unless 2(x)→−∞. Thus, the current model
could be regarded as a variant of Harris-Todaro model [HT70] with migration decision made on the basis of
urban-rural utility differential rather than expected income differential. Consequently, in the present model,
the urban population S =
∑I
i=1
si is at most equal to the total population N =
∑I
i=1
ni (and probably less).
In fact, most of the models of city-size distributions can be thought of as a limiting case of the present
model where trans-tolerance tends to infinity (2(x) → −∞) so that everyone becomes a Chloe. This can
happen in a couple of different ways. Looking at (14), if I remove the concept of distance, i.e., li(x) = 0 so
that any x ∈ X is equidistant and effectively 0 km away from city i, then no one bears the cost of relocation
ρ(0, ·) so that for sufficiently low 3i everyone becomes a Chloe and the size distribution turns uniform.
Similarly, if a or H becomes overwhelmingly dominant and/or 3i → −∞, even in the presence of sensible
distance li(x), everyone moves to city i. The resulting city-size distribution (si)
I
i=1
becomes the (exogenous)
type distribution (mi)
I
i=1
itself. Existing models endogenously derive the city-size distribution using other
factors of choice than imperfect mobility to frame agglomeration (the one more complicated than (6)).
2.6 Inflow as a Function of Distance Moved
Turning back to the aforementioned monotonicity, I establish
Proposition 2.1 Immigration and Distance Moved
For any type i, the inflow of workers mi(x) declines with distance moved for x ∈

pi
2
, pi

.
Proof. Both
∫∞
2(x)
fi(2)d2 and sin x decrease within the range of distance in question, making mi(x) decline
with x . 
10 I will lay off subscript i in 2i(x) until section 3.
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Remark. While this proposition sounds plausible and desirable, it is partly an artifact of having a ball for a
country. In figure 6(b), an unconditional mass of Chloe (the yellow line) drops with distance, whereas the
baseline population (the green line) only does so past the equator. Thus, the product of the two (the red line)
will decline past the equator for certain. What is important is the part that I cannot establish a proposition
for, i.e., what happens between 0 (city i) and pi
2
(the equator). I expect that the percentage of Chloe’s naturally
declines with distance for increasing cost of relocation. However, conditional on 2, the base population itself
will increase with x . The size of the locations equidistant from city i is sin x
2
. With the assumption of a
uniform11 distribution of consumers, there are ni
sin x
2
of potential Chloe’s and Ryan’s, which increase till x
hits the equator. I do not know, when combined, how these two factors play out together. Between x = 0 and
(a)
0 (city i) /2 (equator)
distance x
0
y(x)
n
i
sin(x)/2
S
i
[y(x)]
[n
i
sin(x)/2]S
i
[y(x)]
(b)
Figure 6. The blue line is trans-tolerance 2(x) in both figures. The part sliced off in figure 6(a) is the mass of Chloe’s and
the remaining portion is Ryan’s. Si(2) denotes their survival function of fi(2). In figure 6(b), the yellow line is decreasing
if the blue line is increasing and vice versa. The red line is the product of green and yellow lines, i.e., the volume of the
part sliced off in figure 6(a). It is monotone decreasing in the lower hemisphere x ≥ pi2 (proposition 2.1) but may not be so
in the remaining hemisphere.
pi
2
, the migration rate (the red line in figure 6(b)) actually picks up first for increasing land size ni
sin x
2
before
it eventually starts to wind down as reduction from
∫∞
2(x)
fi(2)d2 eventually overwhelms the increasing land
size.
In view of this, one must be careful when interpreting estimation results in section 3. Just by the look of
mi(x), the real effect of distance intolerance may be offset by a mere geometric (and not economic) fact that
the perimeter of concentric circles gets longer as one moves far from center i towards x = pi
2
.
Lastly, ρ−1(·) is decreasing in 2 as does ρ(·). Then holding else constant, the higher the in-city boost a is,
the lower the trans-tolerance will be, and consequently, the more residents will become a Chloe. The opposite
is true for diseconomies of agglomeration −η log si or the fallback value 3i . Thus, there is a trade-off between
a and si or 3i for given 2(x). To keep to the same 2(x) while a increases, si and/or 3i must be large as well.
As I alluded to in section 2.4, nobody becomes a Diane. Living in a wrong city, her composite good
consumption evens out with Ryan’s but her housing consumption falls behind his. She will be better off
staying put (to become a Ryan) or moving to her type-concordant city (to become a Chloe) than moving into
a city she is not cut out for.
Now that I know all consumers’ location choice, I can define the equilibrium.
11I can easily bypass this problem by banning Chloe and Ryan’s parents from giving birth in the upper hemisphere and making city i an
isolated island. This is indeed a viable scenario for workers moving to Alaskan or Hawaiian cities. For workers with their type-matched cities
found in the 48 contiguous states, the more likely scenario is that the initial distribution is not uniform but rather the opening population
declined with distance from potential city sites to begin with. Since I do not have a way to know what the real initial distribution was, this
scenario does not apply here.
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2.7 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 2.2 Competitive Equilibrium:
An equilibrium is a feasible allocation [ci(x , 2), hi(x , 2), 1i(x , 2)]
I
i=1
and (zi)
I
i=1
, and price system (pi)
I
i=1
∈ RI
+
, such
that [ci(x , 2), hi(x , 2), 1i(x , 2)]
I
i=1
maximizes the utility level and (zi)
I
i=1
maximizes the profit under (pi)
I
i=1
for any
(x , 2) ∈ X × Y and i ∈ {1, · · · , I}
Note that since Diane fails to maximize her utility level and thus such a consumer cannot exist in equi-
librium, (4) and (5) simplify to
siA(si) =
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
∫ ∞
2(x)
ci(x , 2)dFi(2)d x , (17)
H =
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
∫ ∞
2(x)
hi(x , 2)dFi(2)d x , and (18)
in equilibrium.
Furthermore, using Chloe’s demand for goods (8) and the first order condition (7), and (17), the city size
can be written as
si =
1
a
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
∫ ∞
2(x)
{a−ρ[li(x), 2]−η} dFi(2)d x . (19)
The first item, 1
a
on the right-hand side of (19), may seem odd at first. How come the city size declines with
urban productivity? The answer is threefold. The first two reasons are commonplace among the models of
the city-size distribution, whereas the last one is specific to the current model.
First, it simply means that if urbanites are productive, it takes less of them to meet the same demand,
ceteris paribus. Moreover, this adverse effect is actually offset by two forces. To begin with, increased
productivity raises wage, which in turn increases demand as can be seen in (8). The city then needs more
workers to cater for growing demand, increasing si in the end. In most models, this is the end of the story,
and usually the second force (increase in demand) outweighs the first force (reduction in employment due
to better technology to lower required labor), because of the usual size-dependent urban productivity as
opposed to the size-independent productivity (6). Consequently, urban productivity does not reduce the city
size but rather increases it.
Furthermore, unique to the current model, better urban productivity lowers trans-tolerance so that those
who would otherwise stay put will become a Chloe upon realizing an increase in a. The overall effect
depends on the exact shape of fi(·). If fi(·) is low near 2(x), then an increase in a may backfire because A(si) is
only binary and does not have the city size built into it. In this case, immigration is not sensitive to a change
in 2(x) and by extension, in a. The consumer base does not grow much and the city may not need as many
workers after all.
Notice the curious lack of oft-cited utility equalization in definition 2.2, namely, I do not require 3i(a, x , 2, si) =
3 j(a, x , 2, s j) for all i, j (compare this to, for example, the first equation on the right column on page 1446
of Eeckhout [Eec04] or equation (8) in Berliant and Watanabe [BW18]). The utility level can and does vary by
type and by the initial location of a consumer in equilibrium. The utility level varies by type in Eeckhout et
al. (equation (3) in [EPS14]) as well but mine further varies by birthplace.
By and large, a Chloe who happened to be born close to her type destination achieves a higher utility
level than those who did not. There is no way to arbitrage this differential among Chloe’s in the current
model model as they cannot choose or optimize their place to be born into. Neither can we in reality.
The only utility equalization that is guaranteed to take place in the present model is that in the continuum
of distance tolerance, a Chloe who happens to draw 2= 2(x) achieves the same utility level as Ryan’s at each
x ∈ X . Recall that trans-tolerance 2(x) is so defined to pin down the ratio between Chloe’s and Ryan’s.
Therefore, the equilibrium utility level does not equate between Ryan and Chloe either, except at the margin.
Note also that the competitive equilibrium, if exists, is also Pareto optimal. I did not use externalities
of any form, be it positive or negative, to break the otherwise uniform distribution of economic activities.
Congestion, a usual source of negative externalities, exists here but it is priced through the housing market
and thus it is modeled not as real externalities but only as pecuniary externalities. Agglomerations, a usual
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source of positive externalities, take place too but in its uncomplicated form (6), adding another Chloe to a
city does not increase an incumbent Chloe’s productivity, which already took a jump from 1 to a when the
first Chloe moved in and has hung at a since. Thus, the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics
applies here.
2.8 City-Size Distribution
Since I cannot derive the city-size distribution without specifying the form of fi(2), I will narrow down
some candidate forms. First of all, I need to be able to tell types apart using only fi(·). I did not introduce
heterogeneous productivity in (6) in order to keep the focus on geographical mobility. Thus, any difference
in city size needs to arise out of heterogeneous distance tolerance: if fi(·) and f j(·) are identical, then, barring
any other source of heterogeneity, si and s j become identical too as can be seen from (3).
That said, I may introduce heterogeneity via the cost of relocation ρ(·) instead of fi(·) to the same effect.
Put differently, I can define ρi(·) by type. Therefore, I have some degree of freedom. In total there are three
possible ways to move forward from here:
1. Assume fi(·) and ρ(·): Type differs only in distance tolerance but once 2 is drawn, consumers recognize
it in the same way regardless of their type.
2. Assume f (·) and ρi(·): Distance tolerance is identically distributed but the way consumers recognize it
differs by type.
3. Assume fi(·) and ρi(·): A combination of both.
(Note that at least one of the two has to be type dependent or else people will end up in a uniform size
distribution). Researchers are free to pick whichever depending on the data availability. Unfortunately, there
are no data available on either one of them as far as I am aware. Since ρ(·) is bivariate while fi(·) is univariate,
I will take the first option for tractability reasons.
Along with these two functions, one may also make ni vary with i. However, ni is orthogonal to mobility.
To turn off its explanatory power, I assume ni is constant across i. Bear in mind that it is not useful to collect
the data on the size of an individual industry to estimate ni . The size of the industry only represents the
people who did move to the city, but not the potential number of people who are best suited for the industry
but did not make it to the city due to their low distance tolerance. Nevertheless, I will keep the subscript for
comparative statics later to examine the trade-off between ni and fi(·).
Given this, I can rewrite city size (16) as:
si =
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
Si[2(x)]d x , (20)
where Si(2) ··= 1− Fi(2) is the survival function of 2.
I will differentiate distance-tolerance distributions by some criteria to make testable predictions out of
(16). There are various ways to rank density functions. I propose two of them below and discuss their
implications on the city-size distribution.
Proposition 2.2 First-Order Stochastic Dominance and City Size
If fi(·) first-order stochastically dominates f j(·), si ≥ s j in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that fi(·) first-order stochastically dominates f j(·). For any given location x , Si[2(x)] ≥
S j[2(x)]. Integrating both sides of the inequality over the country with the density of ni
sin x
2
= n j
sin x
2
at
each x , one obtains
si =
∫ pi
0
ni
sin x
2
Si[2(x)]d x ≥
∫ pi
0
n j
sin x
2
S j[2(x)]d x = s j (21)
from (20). 
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Remark. Furthermore, if Si(2) > S j(2) at 2 = 2(x), (21) holds with strict inequality. Observe that the inequality
will be flipped if n j is sufficiently larger than ni . That is, there is a trade-off between the distance-tolerance
distribution and the number of potential city residents. Even when type i is overall tolerant towards reloca-
tion, its corresponding city size may be trumped by more intolerant type j if type i is outnumbered by type
j in the hinterland to begin with.
It should also be noted that proposition 2.2 will not hold if estimated si has to match the realized value,
and/or Ryan’s utility level depends on his type attribute. In that case there could be a rank reversal. For
instance, if type i’s default value 3i is higher than type j’s, or the expected value of si is higher than that of
s j (city i is deemed to be overcrowded), then si may fall behind s j because 2(x) of type i will be higher than
type j’s.
The next proposition is useful for the empirical analysis to follow:
Proposition 2.3 Distance Elasticity of Inflow and City Size
Suppose that the inflow can be written as
ni
sin x
2
Si [2(x)] = β1i + β2i x .
If β1i = β1 j and β2i > β2 j , si > s j in equilibrium. Similarly, if β1i > β1 j and β2i = β2 j , si > s j .
Proof. Suppose β1i = β1 j and β2i > β2 j . The equilibrium city size (20) will be si = pib1i +
1
2
pi2β2i > pib1 j +
1
2
pi2β2 j = s j . The similar argument goes for the second part of the proposition. 
Remark. I will discuss the meaning of β2 in section 3.
Rearrange (15) and one can estimate trans-tolerance by
2(x) = S−1
i

mi(x)
ni
sin x
2

. (22)
3 Empirical Testing
3.1 Data Employed
I use US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 2009-2013.12 The questionnaire asks which MSA a
responder lived a year prior to the survey. A total of 381 MSA’s report in- and out-migration13 so that there
are 381×381 entries of inflow and outflow recorded between each pair of cities.
I associate the migration data above with the estimated population in 201314 for two reasons. The most
recent census taken before 2013 was 2010. However, since I frame the model with people moving first to
settle the city size, it is not plausible to regress the result between 2009 and 2013 on 2010 data. The next
census is in 2020, which is still underway at the time of writing.
As can be seen in figure 1(b), exclusion of Alaska and Hawaii improves the fit from R2 = .2185 to .2752.
However, the objective is not to find the best fit for this particular regression. I do not have any theoretical
basis on which to precludes cities in these states. The only difference between the two states and the remain-
ing 48 states is that there are either Canadian cities (not included) or the Pacific (not habitable) lying between
them. However, the western part of the contiguous 48 states is not densely populated either (cf. figure 2(a)).
If I exclude the two states, I may as well have to exclude California, which lists 4 entries on the roster of the
20 largest MSA’s. I will keep them intact throughout this section.
In all the figures and tables to follow, ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote coefficient significant at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
12Data available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2013/demo/geographic-mobility/metro-to-metro-migration.html.
13There were 383 MSA’s as of 2013, two of which were recently promoted from a micro statistical area to MSA. Their size are reported but
inflow data were not yet recorded in the 2009-2013 survey and thus excluded from the study.
14https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-total-metro-and-micro-statistical-areas.html.
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3.2 Translation from Theory to Empirical Analysis
I will make several adjustments to the data above in order to test theoretical implications of section 2.
In theory, the initial distribution is uniform whereas in reality, all locations are pre-populated with a
number of consumers inherited from the previous period. To make the initial distribution as close to a
uniform distribution as possible and eliminate the initial heterogeneity, I normalize the inflow by the total
outflow from the city of origin.
Turning to the geographic difference between the theory and the actual US, while a city is assumed to be
a point in theory, an actual MSA takes up an expanse of land. I will use its centroid to compute its geodesic
to incoming locations. In addition, the present model features a sphere and the maximum moving distance
possible is
p
pi regardless of the destination. The actual US does not stretch over the entire sphere but rather
cuts off at .21
p
pi. Consequently, the maximum distance differs city to city. Among 381 MSA’s, Carson City,
NV15 has the shortest maximum distance possible of 4,187 km, from Bangor, ME. In turn, Honolulu and
Bangor have the longest maximum distance possible of 8,293 km, between each other. While the gap between
the top and bottom of the maximum range is mitigated by the fact that Alaska and Hawaii are included, this
may nevertheless contaminate the estimation results: I may inadvertently underestimate Carson City’s size
for the reason other than distance tolerance, i.e., even if there were someone willing to move to the city from
8,293 km away, that worker will not show up in the data because the country cuts off at 4,187 km. I may
overshoot Honolulu and Bangor vice versa.
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Figure 7.
That being said, I do not detect any systemic interaction between the maximum range and city size in
figure 7.16 The cap on the distance (unsurprisingly) does not affect the city size. While the longest cutoff
is about twice as long as the shortest cutoff, consumers perceive the distance in a logarithmic scale. The
perceived gap is thus much smaller than twofold as a linear scale implies. I will nevertheless regress city size
on inflow and the maximum range in section 3.4. The latter captures the said non-economic constraints so
that the coefficient on the former will not be watered down by their presence.
Some city pairs report a flow of zero. However, I need to take a log of the regressand as a linear scale is
useless in the city-size context (cf. Limpert et al. [LSA01]). As with the city-size distribution itself, the vast
majority of incoming cities are small. The difference between a flow of zero and one is marginal and should
not be a determining factor in the estimations to follow.
In order to stabilize the readings, I impute the flow by raising them by one across the board. One may
instead drop the cities with an inflow of zero. However, doing so will discount the fact that no one moved
from those cities, the observation that is equally as important as the fact that someone moved from other
cities. Besides, some estimates are sensitive to this removal, when they should not be. To compensate for this
distortion, I will conduct a separate regression using quantiles in section 3.5, where I do not augment the
15Very coincidentally, Carson City was also the smallest MSA in 2013.
16To be consistent with the remainder of the current section, I measure the maximum distance in log scale. Since maximum distances are
already quite long thanks in particular to inclusion of two Hawaiian MSA’s, taking a log of them barely changes the estimation.
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flow and leave the flow of zero as is.
I carry out three sets of empirical analysis to examine the nature of interaction between the distance
tolerance and the city size by industry. In section 3.3 I regress the city size on the moments of mi(x) by
industry. Section 3.4 examines the relationship between the size and the rate of decline of mi(x). Finally in
section 3.5 I regress the size on quantiles to ensure robustness of the preceding two analyses.
Having done all the three estimations above, I will then extrapolate the trans-tolerance value for each
type from the existing city size in section 3.6.
3.3 Regression on Moments
First, I regress the city size on the mean and standard deviation of its inflow in table 1. When the mean or
the standard deviation of inflow inflates by 1%, the destination’s size grows by .5% and .7% respectively. The
findings indicates that the pdf flattens out and shifts to the right with the city size in line with proposition 2.2.
For any given x , large cities have a high mean of inflow than small cities, which in turn implies that the former
first-order stochastically dominates the latter in 2. Note that if one assumes perfect mobility instead, the mean
and variance of distance moved would be the same for any i and thus orthogonal to the city size, which is
unlikely according to figure 8.
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Figure 8. Color and line width are size proportionate.
intercept mean standard deviation R2 adjusted R2
coefficient 7.365∗∗∗ 0.8059∗∗∗ 0.1079 0.1056
t-statistic 9.39 6.77
coefficient 6.975∗∗∗ 0.8024∗∗∗ 0.4005 0.3989
t-statistic 19.38 15.91
coefficient 3.988∗∗∗ 0.5123∗∗∗ 0.7487∗∗∗ 0.4423 0.4394
t-statistic 6.02 5.32 15.05
Table 1.
There are some notable outliers. Four CDF’s in Alaska and Hawaii (two each in each state) do not take
off until later because they only have one city nearby (the one and only other MSA in the same state) and
the next hike in value needs to wait till they cross the Pacific or Canada. They are largely a geographical
artifact and do not necessarily mean that they gather high-skilled labor. Aside from them, among large cities,
Philadelphia consists mostly of locally sourced labor, whereas Seattle and Riverside take in more globally
oriented workers. However, conditional on the mean, Philadelphia and Riverside find residents of more
diverse origin than Seattle does for their size.
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While both of them are significant, table 1 indicates that the standard deviation exerts more influence on
the size than the mean does. The size responds more to how widespread the cities of origin are than to how
far people moved on average. Consequently, the aforementioned geographical artifact does not distort the
projected city size in Alaska and Hawaii as much.
3.4 Regression on Distance Elasticity of Inflow
There are two more ways to summarize the inflow distribution than the moments examined above. In this
section, I regress the city size on its inflow over x and compute coefficient β1i on the constant and β2i on x as
in figure 1(b), not only for St. Louis but for all 381 MSA’s. Then I further regress the city sizes on β1i and β2i .
Table 2 and figure 9 report the results.
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intercept β1 β2 β1β2 max range R
2 adjusted
R2
coefficient 12.79∗∗∗ .2183∗∗∗ .3641 .3624
t-statistic 285.53 14.73
coefficient 11.22∗∗∗ -1.394∗∗∗ .1736 .1714
t-statistic 66.37 -8.92
coefficient 20.35∗∗∗ .9360∗∗∗ 6.914∗∗∗ .7000 .6985
t-statistic 55.15 25.76 20.58
coefficient 20.69∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 7.106∗∗∗ .1287∗∗∗ .7224 .7202
t-statistic 57.37 23.92 21.83 5.51
coefficient 7.532∗∗∗ .9224∗∗∗ 6.345∗∗∗ 1.394∗∗∗ .7484 .7464
t-statistic 4.88 27.64 20.13 8.52
coefficient 7.054∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 6.525∗∗∗ .1462∗∗∗ 1.487∗∗∗ .7771 .7747
t-statistic 4.84 26.85 21.88 6.95 9.60
Table 2. Note that the reported values are the coefficients of the coefficients β1 and β2 themselves.
Since I take a log of x and si , β2 measures the percentage increase in inflow against a 1% increase in
distnace, i.e., the distance elasticity of inflow. I included the interactive term β1β2 as a regressor. While I
cannot fully predict the city size by β1 or β2 alone, the product of the two tends to be high among large cities
than among small cities.
Having controlled for the maximum range and other city-specific terms, the city size increases by 6.5%
when the distance elasticity of inflow grows by 1%. That is, it is unlikely that a city has a large population
and is unable to bring in people from afar. In turn, an industry with a low trans-tolerance value boasts a
large city.
In figure 9, all four entries from Alaska and Hawaii cut below the estimated size. It is likely a systemic
pattern. Given the size of the city, these cities should have lower β2 and they would have if they were
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surrounded by other cities nearby. In reality, they are surrounded by Canada or the Pacific, neither one of
them provides an inflow.
None of these would matter if one assumed perfect mobility. New York City may be composed exclusively
of people fromNew England or of people from California, with no difference in its size in the end. In contrast,
the present model anticipates that New York City cannot have the size it has unless it gathers workers from
across the country. Conversely, Beaumont, TX cannot have many people moving in from California, which
would otherwise indicate that high-skilled labor would move to Beaumont, running counter to the fact that
the city is actually small. Unlike New York City, most of its inflow should and does originate from within its
vicinity as its low β2 value suggests.
3.5 Regression on Quantiles
Lastly, I regress the city size on quantiles. Unlike previous sections 3.3 and 3.4 I do not have to impute or
alter an inflow of 0 here because I only take a log of distance rather than inflow. The results still point to the
same direction as sections 3.3 and 3.4 do.
A 2-quantile estimation (the first row in table 3) indicates that the farther the median is, the larger the city
will be, which meshes with figure 8(a) in section 3.3 and figure 9 in section 3.4. For 3 quantiles and above,
regardless of the number of quantiles, the farther quantiles are always positively correlated with the city size.
On the other hand, the nearest quantile is negatively correlated with the size only if the distance is split in 3
to 5 ways. Above 5, the quantiles are too fine and start to pick up noises.
Large cities’ trans-tolerance grows slowly with x and consequently, mi(x) falls slower than small cities’.
If the majority of the residents are moving in from remote locations, the last quantile should be far. The
resulting city size should be large according to proposition 2.2. Figure 10(b) seems to support the proposition.
By the same token, if the majority of residents are moving in from the nearby locations, the first quantile is
short and according to proposition 2.2, the resulting city size should be small. Although not as strongly as
the previous case does, figure 10(a) echoes the proposition as well.
While R2 values are lower than those found in tables 1 and 2 due to the lack of control for other variables,
this analysis complements sections 3.3 and 3.4 and ensures its robustness.
intercept 1st quantile 2nd
quantile
3rd
quantile
4th
quantile
5th
quantile
6th
quantile
R2 adjusted
R2
coefficient 1.217 1.332∗∗∗ 0.1372 0.1350
t-statistic 0.82 7.77
coefficient 10.09∗∗∗ -0.03591 .4353∗∗∗ 0.0875 0.0827
t-statistic 22.83 -0.33 4.23
coefficient 9.748∗∗∗ -0.116 0.2254∗ .3015∗∗ 0.0968 0.0896
t-statistic 18.37 -1.01 1.96 2.48
coefficient 9.260∗∗∗ -0.03657 0.06634 0.1557 .3264∗∗ 0.0983 0.0887
t-statistic 15.3 -0.29 0.4 0.98 2.3
coefficient 9.280∗∗∗ 0.1062 -0.3106∗ 0.3752∗ 0.06757 0.2694∗ 0.1034 0.0915
t-statistic 13.59 0.8 -1.76 1.95 0.37 1.7
coefficient 8.895∗∗∗ 0.1801 -.5429∗∗∗ .4859∗∗ 0.0266 0.07047 0.03307∗ 0.1118 0.0975
t-statistic 11.52 1.23 -2.59 2.27 0.12 0.32 1.76
Table 3.
3.6 Estimation of the City’s Type
By examining the distribution of the distance moved of incoming residence, one can infer which city corre-
sponds to which type. For the time being, I will assume that 2 follows the normal distribution with mean µi
and variance σi for expository purposes. (In practice, any distribution with the property in proposition 2.2
will do). I set µi equal to the log of the total inflow the destination receives, and shift it upwards by µ171
across the board so that the city of geometric mean size (Tuscaloosa, AL, 171st in rank in this case) will have
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Figure 10.
the mean of zero. The variance is set to unity. The actual tolerance distribution can be imputed from other
observable variables such as the distribution of wage, the number of children or educational attainment,
which I will leave for future research. I ran kernel density estimation on inflow first to filter out the noise.
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Figure 11. Trans-tolerance by distance. Line color and width are proportional to the total inflow into each destination.
Figure 11 plots 2i(x) for all the destinations and table 4 lists 2i(x) for select destinations at x = 10
0, 101, · · · , 105
km.17 All in all, large cities register lower trans-tolerance values than small cities. For instance, a resident
x = 103 km away from her type destination has to have only 2 = −2.87 or above to move to Los Angeles,
whereas that of Lewiston, ID and WA needs to exceed 2.37. If 2i(x) is assumed (and likely) to be negatively
correlated with the skill level for instance, then those who move to Los Angeles are more skilled than those
who move to Lewiston, ID and WA.
Among cities listed in table 4, Riverside seems to attract workers from a wider range of locations than
its cohort. Conversely, Albany, OR is more locally oriented compared to MSA’s of similar size and thus less
productive than what its size alone suggests.
17Some destinations record −∞ in their immediate vicinity due to scant data points I have to obtain robust readings. These represents
trans-tolerance values for residents who were born only 100 or 101 km away from their type destination, which are expectedly low. While
x starts from 0 in theory, unfortunately, the majority of MSA’s are more than 102 km apart from each other and I do not have enough data
density from which to extrapolate those residents’ accurate trans-tolerance value. They are likely to be recorded as movers within the same
MSA in practice. By contrast MSA’s are treated as a point in section 2 and consumers cannot conceivably move within a point.
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rank remark MSA total inflow 2i
 
100

2i
 
101

2i
 
102

2i
 
103

2i
 
104

2i
 
105

1 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 244,099 -∞ -10.46 -4.84 -2.87 -0.24 4.13
2 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 228,599 -∞ -9.59 -4.51 -2.89 -0.37 3.86
3 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria,
DC-VA-MD-WV
196,434 -∞ -10.51 -4.26 -2.52 -0.19 4.23
4 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 178,510 -10.35 -6.21 -3.82 -2.02 -0.60 1.49
5 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 172,896 -∞ -∞ -5.15 -2.75 0.75 5.16
34 St. Louis, MO-IL 52,944 -∞ -∞ -3.99 -1.23 1.54 5.32
44 max range Urban Honolulu, HI 41,804 -∞ -∞ -7.51 -3.22 0.85 5.95
95 1st quarter Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA 22,928 -∞ -7.51 -2.02 0.04 2.34 6.68
171 geometric mean Tuscaloosa, AL 11,911 -7.11 -3.22 -0.95 0.65 2.14 4.25
191 2nd quarter Sierra Vista-Douglas, AZ 10,576 -7.78 -4.12 -1.57 0.14 2.07 4.86
286 3rd quarter Albany, OR 5,658 -∞ -∞ 0.78 1.59 6.48 7.87
314 max range Bangor, ME 4,540 -∞ -6.34 -1.19 1.36 3.55 8.08
366 min range and size Carson City, NV 3,062 -3.37 -1.29 0.39 1.85 3.22 4.75
381 last quarter Lewiston, ID-WA 1,732 -∞ -3.95 0.10 2.37 4.52 8.25
Table 4.
4 Conclusion and Extensions
I examined the role tolerance to distance moved plays in determining the city-size distribution. Each worker
draws a distance tolerance level from the distribution unique to her type. She then makes a decision on
whether to stay put or move to a city to tap into urban productivity that the city has to offer. She compares
urban productivity with an urban housing market, a fallback value of her utility level when she stays, and
of course, how far the city is from her birthplace when making a location choice. I derive the trans-tolerance
value at which the workers splits between movers and non-movers, which is a function of the aforementioned
location choice factors. The city-size distribution arises as a result of the trans-tolerance value specific to each
industry and city.
I regressed the city size on several aspects of the underlying distribution of distance tolerance. The
empirical data are in accordance with the predictions from the model.
I assumed that each city hosts at most one type. In reality, cities host multiple types. Assuming co-
location of different types in the same city in in the same way as Eeckhout et al. [EPS14] would yield a finer
result than above, provided that relocation data are recorded by industry. I do not know of such data.
In order to stay focused on the city size, I left urban productivity as plain as possible. In reality, the dis-
tance moved may reveal the immigrants’ productivity levels, the aggregate of which determines the citywide
productivity. It will be useful to relax the current assumption on urban productivity and have the distance
moved explain it.
As examined in section 2.6, no one becomes a Diane in equilibrium. In reality, it is not easy to know
in advance where the type-match city is located. Skill compatibility is not fully understood until workers
actually start working at their destination, which may or may not be the right destination. One may introduce
some uncertainty in matching between type and industry in order to analyze when and where Diane-type
workers can exist in equilibrium.
I assumed that consumers live for two periods: a youth period in the city of birth and an adult period
after they made a relocation decision. Some workers switch their cities multiple times in the course of their
lifetime in reality. The current model can be extended to incorporate a longer time horizon.
As I alluded to when I estimated the trans-tolerance value from the migration data, ideally, I would like
to start with the observed data rather than estimating from the migration data. While there are no data on
distance tolerance per se, there are ways to infer its distribution. For instance, the number of children in the
household may reveal their opportunity cost of labor. That implies their skill level, which in turn, can be
used to gauge their trans-tolerance level as these two variables are deemed to be negatively correlated.
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A Appendix
A.1 Selection of Utility Function
With the quasi-linear utility function, the difference in disposable income, i.e., wage exclusive of the cost of
relocation ρ(·), is simply absorbed by ci(x), while hi(x) remains constant. That is, hi(x) is the same no matter
how long the distance moved is, while ci(x) will adjust to accommodate the differences in ρ(·).
On the other hand, the counteracting force against agglomeration is captured solely via hi(x). The rent
grows with city size si and with the fixed land supply of H , hi(x) declines with si . However, the city size
itself will not affect ci(x).
Thus, with the quasi-linear utility function, I have a clean separation of variation in distance moved
(registered exclusively through ci(x)) and the diseconomies of agglomeration (registered exclusively through
hi(x)). As an added bonus, ci(x) becomes linear in disposable income in the end. I can regard ci(x) simply
as a leftover income after deducting housing expenses and ρ(·).
This does not preclude the use of other specifications such as Cobb-Douglas or by extension, a CES utility
function, which will violate one more assumption of Starett’s theorem. I opt for the quasi-linear utility
function to leave out complications not essential for my analysis.
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